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16 December 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE STUDY GROUP, PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FIELD COMMANDERS

SUBJECT : Meeting of the Study Group on 16 January 1975

1. The Study Group will meet at 1000 hours, 16 January 1975 in Room 2E1010, the Pentagon. In addition to the members, the Chairmen of the Working Groups and the computer program support officer will attend.

2. Tentative agenda:

- a. Working Group progress briefings.
- b. Revised study milestones.
- c. Interim Working Group report.
- d. Briefing for study sponsors.
- e. Form and content of preliminary and final Study Group reports.
- f. Form and content of progress report to study sponsors.
- g. Intensive review of study report prior to Study Group approval.

3. A strawman format for the preliminary and final Study Group reports and a tentative revision of study milestones are attached. Your comments on these are requested by 3 January 1975.

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4. The Study Group report will include a list of all studies that have been completed, or are now in progress, that relate to the tactical/national intelligence interface. Request you provide the Study Group executive officers, by 10 January 1975, a list of all such studies completed by your organization, or in which it is now involved. The list should include the name of the study; its purpose; the authority directing it; action officers; the date, or expected date, of completion; and the classification.



G. W. Dyer
Gerald W. Dyer
Captain, USN



IC Staff

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:

- 1 - Each Study Group member/observer (12)
- 1 - Chairman, National Working Group 
- 1 - Chairman, Theater Working Group (Mr. Graves)
- 1 - Chief, Research & Analysis Branch, MPRRD/IC 
- 3 - Each Study Group executive Officer

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REVISED STUDY MILESTONES

PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

TO FIELD COMMANDERS

16 Jan 1975	Working Group Progress Briefing for Study Group
20 Jan 1975	Working Group Interim Reports
	a. Working Group Organization and Methodology
	b. Deviations from Terms of Reference Approved by the Study Group and Reasons Therefor
	c. Information Needs and Capabilities Identified
	d. Problems and Action Taken or Required
	e. Working Group Schedule through 21 April 1975
24 Jan 1975	Co-Chairmen Brief Study Sponsors on Progress
31 Jan 1975	Written Progress Report to Study Sponsors
31 Mar 1975	Working Group Preliminary Reports
	a. Unresolved Problems
	b. Draft Reports with Tentative Conclusions and Recommendations

1-4 Apr 1975	Study Group Consideration of Preliminary Reports and Guidance to Working Groups
21 Apr 1975	Working Group Final Reports
28 Apr-2 May 1975	Study Group Consideration of Working Group Reports <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Additional Tasks for Working Groups, if Requiredb. Guidance to Executive Officersc. Designation of Experts for Intensive Review
12-16 May 1975	Intensive Review in Isolation <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Resolve Substantive Issuesb. Consider Dissents
12-16 May 1975	Executive Officers prepare Working Draft of Final Study Report in Isolation
19-23 May 1975	Study Group Approval of Study Report
24 May-5 Jun 1975	Publication of Study Report
6 Jun 1975	Study Group Submits Final Report to Chairman, JCS and D/DCI/IC
23-27 Jun 1975	Study Group Consideration of JCS and IC Staff Comments
1 Jul 1975	Secretary of Defense and DCI Receive Study with JCS and IC Staff Comments, and Study Group Consideration of Comments, as Appropriate

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FORMAT FOR PRELIMINARY AND FINAL REPORTS

PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
FIELD COMMANDERS

This strawman format:

- a. Outlines for Study Group consideration the suggested content and sequence of the preliminary and final Study Group reports.
- b. Provides for Study Group review draft language for segments of (1) the introduction to the report and, (2) the chapter on scenario development and analysis.

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Chapter III is detached;
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CONTENTS

Preface

- Chapter I Executive Summary
- II Introduction
- III Scenario Development and Analysis
- IV Theater Information Needs and Theater Collection and Reporting Assets
- V National Foreign Intelligence Capabilities
- VI Obstacles to Providing National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders
- VII Conclusions and Recommendations

Annexes

- A Terms of Reference
- B List of Related Studies
- C References
- D Command Relationship Directives, Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding
- E Study Participants
- F Theater Information Needs
- G Theater Collection and Reporting Capabilities
- H Tasking of Theater Collection and Reporting Assets
- I Assessment of Confidence in Capability of Theater Assets to Satisfy Theater EEI
- J National Foreign Intelligence Assets Available for Collecting and Reporting Against Theater EEI.
- K Assessment of Confidence in Capability of National Collection and Reporting Assets to Satisfy Theater EEI.

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PREFACE

A. Background Leading to Pilot Study.

1. Presidential memoranda of 5 November 1971 and 9 October 1974.
2. Concept for approach to the tactical/national intelligence interface.
3. Memorandum of Agreement.
4. DoD identification of non-CDIP assets that contribute intelligence.
5. Complexity of the problem.

B. Current Environment.

1. Command initiatives relating to the tactical/national intelligence interface.
2. October 1973 Mid-East war post-mortems.
3. Other studies relating to the tactical/national intelligence interface (list at Annex B).

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CHAPTER I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- A. Purpose of Study.
- B. Significant Deviations from Terms of Reference.
- C. Major Limitations
- D. Major Assumptions.
- E. Theater Information Needs and Theater Reporting Capabilities.
 - 1. Information need highlights for each phase considered.
 - 2. Collection and reporting capability highlights for each phase considered.
 - 3. Summary of USCINCEUR tasking of theater collection and reporting assets against theater EEI.
 - 4. Summary of findings on theater capability to satisfy theater EEI.
- F. National Foreign Intelligence Capabilities.
 - 1. Summary of findings on the availability of national foreign intelligence assets for collection and reporting against theater EEI for each phase considered.
 - 2. Summary of findings on the capability of national foreign intelligence assets to satisfy theater EEI for each phase.
- G. Summary of Major Obstacles to Providing National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders.

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- H. Summary of Significant Dissenting Views.
- I. Conclusions and Recommendations.

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CHAPTER II

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of Study.

1. The purpose of the study, as set forth in the Terms of Reference (Annex A), is:

a. To provide the basis for recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of Central Intelligence regarding:

(1) The National Foreign Intelligence Program

support that could be made available to satisfy the essential intelligence needs of USCINCEUR and his subordinate commanders for contingency operations in the Mediterranean area.

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(2) The conduct of follow-on studies of the tactical/national intelligence interface.

b. To develop and implement the computer programs and data base to support the overall tactical/national intelligence interface study.

2. One aspect of the tactical/national intelligence interface studies, when completed, will be to compare tactical and national intelligence needs and capabilities to determine areas where mutual support is possible. There is now no

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precedent for making such a broad comparison. This pilot study is an attempt at a simplified comparison of intelligence needs and collection and reporting capabilities within manageable proportions, in order to develop a method to approach the broader problem.

3. Parameters (criteria) for the comparison of intelligence requirements and collection and reporting capabilities for the pilot study were adopted by the Study Group. They are:

- a. Capabilities.

- (1) Geographic area or location accessed.
- (2) Subject matter coverage
- (3) Type of output:
 - a) Specific sensor output (i.e., photography, radar imagery, ELINT, HUMINT document or materiel acquisition, etc.)
 - b) Reporting capability (i.e., written reports, electrical message, voice message, etc.).
- (4) Timeliness (time required to task, collect, process, analyze and disseminate).
- (5) Tolerances
 - a) Average accuracy of location.
 - b) Accuracy in pinpointing time of occurrence.

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- c) Accuracy of identifying number of things
or events.
- d) Accuracy of movement determination.
- e) Accuracy of speed determination.
- (6) Validity assigned to information when disseminated.
- b. Requirements.
 - (1) Geographic area or location of interest.
 - (2) Subject of interest.
 - (3) Type of response desired:
 - a) Specific sensor output or material (i.e.,
graphs, electronic signal, document,
hardware, etc.).
 - b) Format (i.e., written report, oral spot
report, etc.).
 - (4) Required timeliness (turnabout time from statement
of requirements to receipt of answer).
 - (5) Tolerances
 - a) Accuracy of location.
 - b) Time of observation
 - c) Quantity
 - d) Direction of movement
 - e) Speed of movement

(6) Credibility needed to act.

4. Milestones for the study (annex).

C. Scope.

1. Considerations affecting the scope of the pilot study were:
 - a. The complexity of the spectrum of tactical/national intelligence relationships.
 - b. The lack of detailed information regarding worldwide command information needs for contingency and combat operations in the several conflict environments.
 - c. Uncertainty regarding the future structure of US military forces worldwide.
 - d. Uncertainty regarding the initial operational capability and deployment of intelligence systems under development, and the availability of supporting processing and dissemination systems.
 - e. The lack of a comprehensive, worldwide inventory of theater and subordinate command collection and reporting capabilities.
 - f. The wide variety and great number of situations worldwide, for which contingency and war plans have been developed, that affect relationships and support between the intelligence assets controlled by the forces and the assets controlled at the national level.

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- g. The lack of a proven methodology for dealing with tactical/national intelligence relationships.
- h. The need to make a start within reasonable time toward understanding tactical/national intelligence relationships and the possibilities for mutual support.

2. These consideration led to a deliberate decision to limit the scope of the pilot study. The limitations are:

- a. Geographic: The pilot study is limited to a contingency situation in the Middle East and a continuing threat to central Europe.
- b. Theater forces: Theater intelligence forces are limited to those available to a single unified commander (USCINCEUR) for the specific contingency situation.
- c. Information needs: EEI are limited to those specified by USCINCEUR for the specific contingency situation.
- d. Collection and reporting assets: Intelligence capabilities are limited to the systems, units and activities that have achieved at least initial operational capability by 31 December 1974.
- e. Political: The political situation is assumed to be comparable to that which obtained during the October

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1973 Mid East war; no additional political factors that could significantly alter the then existing situation are considered in the pilot study.

3. The limitations for the pilot study are not assumed for the overall tactical/national intelligence interface. They are merely a means of creating a manageable situation for a first, in-depth effort to understand the complexities of the relationships involved, and to permit logical decisions for further studies of the tactical/national intelligence interface.

D. Definitions (for the purpose of this study):

1. Collection and Reporting Asset: A means available for use in an operational or support role, such as an individual, a unit, sensor, or sensor-platform combination, to acquire, process, analyze, produce or report intelligence or intelligence information.
2. Confidence factor: An expression of judgment of the probability that a collection or reporting asset, or specific combination of assets, will be able to satisfy an information need, or combination of information needs the satisfaction of which requires essentially the same data. The confidence factor judgments are based on the degree to which the criteria for collection and reporting capabilities match the criteria for requirements (paragraph A3, Chapter II).

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3. Essential Element(s) of Information (EEI): The critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence, in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision.
4. Intelligence Target: The combination of geographic area, or nationality, and subject that is, or is planned to be, the focus of a specific intelligence collection, processing or production undertaking.
5. National Foreign Intelligence Asset: An intelligence asset the tasking or employment of which is subject to national level control, such as validation of requirements by the USIB, or 40 Committee approval. They include all assets funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program except those under the direct operational command and tasking authority of a unified/specified commander or subordinate organization, and those other assets not in the NFIP that are principally responsive to national-level requirements, such as SR-71 strategic reconnaissance aircraft.
6. Operational Command (control): Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It does not

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include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. The terms operational command and operational control are synonymous.

7. Tasking: The assignment by competent authority of an intelligence target to a collection or reporting asset.
8. Theater Collection and Reporting Assets: Collection and reporting assets under the operational command of a theater commander or one of his subordinate commands. They include the collection and reporting assets in the National Foreign Intelligence Program that are in or in support of theater forces and under the operational control of theater command.

E. Deviations from Terms of Reference.

F. Study Organization and Methodology (names of participants at annex).

1. Study Group
2. National Working Group organization and methodology.
3. Theater Working Group organization and methodology.

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CHAPTER IV

THEATER INFORMATION NEEDS AND THEATER COLLECTION
AND REPORTING ASSETS

(Will address only the phases considered in the Study)

- A. Theater Information Needs (detailed listings, by phase, at appendices to annex).
 - 1. Character of information needs for Phase I (deployment of initial elements of US Forces; show of force).
 - 2. Character of information needs for Phase II (initiation of defensive operations).
 - 3. Character of information needs for Phase III, Stage X (initiation and conduct of conventional combat operations).
 - 4. Character of information needs for Phase III, Stage Y (preparation for nuclear warfare).
- B. Theater Collection and Reporting Capabilities (detailed list of theater collection and reporting assets at annex--indicate time of change of operational command/control to USCINCEUR for each phase. Highlight differences/changes in capabilities in and between phases and stages.)
 - 1. Summary of Phase I collection and reporting capabilities.
 - 2. Summary of Phase II collection and reporting capabilities.
 - 3. Summary of Phase III, Stage X collection and reporting capabilities.

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4. Summary of Phase III, Stage Y collection and reporting capabilities.
- C. USCINCEUR Tasking of Theater Collection and Reporting Assets Against Theater EEI (explanation of EUCOM rationale for tasking, including effect of mission assignments on availability/capability of theater assets.)
- D. Assessment of Confidence in Capability of Theater Assets to Satisfy Theater EEI. (Detailed matrices of assets, EEI and confidence of satisfaction factors at appendices to annex.)
 1. Summary, by phase, of information needs completely satisfied by theater assets.
 2. Summary, by phase, of information needs that cannot be satisfied by theater assets.
 3. Summary, by phase, of information needs for which some non-theater assistance is needed for high confidence of satisfaction.
- E. Dissenting Views and Rationale
 1. Theater dissent.
 2. Service/agency dissent.

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CHAPTER V

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

(Will address only the phases considered in the study)

- A. National Foreign Intelligence Assets Available for Collecting and Reporting Against Theater EEI (detailed list of national foreign intelligence assets, including Foreign Service, at annex--indicate for each the phase at which available for tasking against theater EEI. Highlight differences/changes in capabilities in and between phases and stages.)
 - 1. Summary of national assets available for collection and reporting against theater EEI during Phase I.
 - 2. Summary of national assets available for collection and reporting against theater EEI during Phase II.
 - 3. Summary of national assets available for collection and reporting against theater EEI during Phase III, Stage X.
 - 4. Summary of national assets available for collection and reporting against theater EEI during Phase III, Stage Y.
- B. Assessment of Confidence in Capability of National Collection and Reporting Assets to Satisfy Theater EEI (detailed matrices of assets, EEI and confidence factors at appendices to annex).
 - 1. Summary, by phase, of information needs that can be completely satisfied by national assets.

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2. Summary, by phase, of information needs that cannot be satisfied or can be satisfied only with low confidence by national assets.
 3. Summary of other contributions national assets can make to the satisfaction of theater information needs.
- C. Effect of National Priorities. (Discuss, by phase, the effect that the increasing Soviet threat worldwide could have on the actual availability of national assets for tasking against theater EEI, and the priorities theater EEI might command relative to national priorities. Assess for the findings in paragraphs B1 and B3, above, the confidence with which commanders could rely on the national intelligence support identified.)
- D. Dissenting views.
1. Dissent by system operators.
 2. Dissent by Services/agencies.

CHAPTER VI

OBSTACLES TO PROVIDING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT TO FIELD COMMANDERS

- A. . Obstacles That can be Resolved Within the Theater.
- B. Obstacles That can be Resolved By Individual Services and Agencies.
- C. Obstacles That can be Resolved By the Secretary of Defense/Director of Central Intelligence.
- D. Obstacles That Require Higher Authority or Legislation for Resolution.

NOTE: A single obstacle may overlap several levels. For example, for a given obstacle, a partial resolution might be accomplished within the theater, although complete resolution would require action by the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the 40 Committee, another Department, or even the Congress. Some potential obstacles that might be identified in the pilot study are:

- Compartmentation of information
- Distribution listings
- Statements of intelligence interest
- Command and control relationships.
- Cover and operational security measures.
- Communications
- Equipment compatibility
- Conditions of combat.

E. Dissenting Views.

1. Theater dissent.
2. Service/agency dissent.

CHAPTER VII


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Shortfalls in Theater Capabilities to Satisfy Theater EEI.
- B. Effect of National Priorities on the Reliability of National Intelligence Support.
- C. National Intelligence Support That Can Be Made Available
- D. Obstacles to Providing National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders.
- E. Further Studies of the Tactical/National Intelligence Interface, in Order of Priority.
- F. IDHS/ADP Support for Further Tactical/National Intelligence Interface Studies.

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
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2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	✓		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

- ① Draft thank you pls
- ② Agree re Congress -
- ③ Pleased work thru ASD(I) - Will consult to work up NFIPB Rec
- ④ Hope arrange max support nat-tact.



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